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To establish whether human-to-human transmission of
influenza A H5N1 occurred in the healthcare setting in
Vietnam, we conducted a cross-sectional seroprevalence
survey among hospital employees exposed to 4 confirmed
and 1 probable H5N1 case-patients or their clinical speci-
mens.  Eighty-three (95.4%) of 87 eligible employees com-
pleted a questionnaire and provided a serum sample,
which was tested for antibodies to influenza A H5N1.
Ninety-five percent  reported exposure to >1 H5N1 case-
patients; 59 (72.0%) reported symptoms, and 2 (2.4%) ful-
filled the definition for a possible H5N1 secondary
case-patient. No study participants had detectable antibod-
ies to influenza A H5N1. The data suggest that the H5N1
viruses responsible for human cases in Vietnam in January
2004 are not readily transmitted from person to person.
However, influenza viruses are genetically variable, and
transmissibility is difficult to predict. Therefore, persons pro-
viding care for H5N1 patients should continue to take
measures to protect themselves.
D
irect transmission of H5N1 viruses of purely avian
origin from birds to humans was first described dur-
ing an outbreak among poultry in Hong Kong in 1997. In
that outbreak, 6 of 18 confirmed human H5N1 case-
patients died (1), and serologic evidence was found for
asymptomatic infection in humans after exposure to infect-
ed poultry (2).Avian-to-human transmission of influenza
viruses is believed to be infrequent because of host barri-
ers to infection, such as cell receptor specificities, and
because the acquisition by avian viruses of the ability for
human-to-human transmission requires either genetic reas-
sortment with a human influenza strain or genetic mutation
(3). However, a study of household and social contacts of
Hong Kong H5N1 case-patients found evidence, although
limited, for human-to-human transmission (4). Further evi-
dence was provided by a study of healthcare workers
(HCWs), which found that significantly more HCWs
exposed to patients with H5N1 infection were positive for
H5 antibody than nonexposed HCWs (3.7% vs. 0.7%); 2
HCWs seroconverted after exposure to H5N1-infected
patients, in the absence of known poultry exposure (5).
These 2 studies provided the first evidence, although lim-
ited, of human-to-human transmission of H5N1 viruses of
purely avian origin.
On December 12, 2003, influenza AH5N1 viruses were
detected among poultry at a farm near Seoul, the Republic
of Korea (6), and outbreaks of H5N1 in poultry were sub-
sequently reported in 8 other Asian countries (Japan,
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and Malaysia); a situation that the Office International des
Epizooties has called “a crisis of global importance” (7).
Human case-patients infected with H5N1 related to these
poultry outbreaks were identified in Vietnam and Thailand
in January 2004, and on September 28, 2004, possible
human-to-human transmission was reported in a family
cluster in Thailand (8).
Concern is widespread that the current situation in
Asia favors the emergence of a highly pathogenic
influenza virus with the ability for efficient transmission
from person to person, which would lead to an influenza
pandemic. While experiences from Hong Kong in 1997
indicate that human-to-human transmission of purely
avian H5N1 viruses is possible but not sustainable, genet-
ic alterations over time may lead to subsequent H5N1
infections behaving quite differently. An understanding
of the current and absolute risk for human-to-human
transmission of circulating avian H5N1 viruses is vital to
guide appropriate public health and infection control
responses and to inform pandemic preparedness.
Unfortunately, little data are available to quantify the
transmissibility of the H5N1 strains currently circulating
in poultry in Asia. To investigate the risk for human-to-
human transmission of avian H5N1 viruses to hospital
employees, we undertook a cross-sectional seropreva-
lence study among employees of 1 hospital in Vietnam,
who were exposed to confirmed and probable H5N1
case-patients or their clinical samples.
Methods
From December 27, 2003, to January 19, 2004, 4 chil-
dren, 4–12 years of age, with confirmed H5N1 infection
and 1 with probable H5N1 infection were admitted and
treated at the National Pediatric Hospital (NPH), Hanoi,
Vietnam. Detailed information regarding the 4 confirmed
H5N1 patients has been published elsewhere (9). Eligible
study participants were hospital employees who had possi-
ble exposure to the patients with confirmed or probable
H5N1 infections, such as by working in wards or entering
rooms where H5N1 patients were admitted, or having han-
dled clinical specimens from these patients. To allow suf-
ficient time for seroconversion in any infected HCWs, the
study took place 29 days after discharge of the last con-
firmed H5N1 patient. All eligible participants were pro-
vided with written and verbal information about the study
and gave written consent for participation. 
Definitions
We used the following definitions in our study: study
period, from date of admission of first confirmed case-
patient (December 27, 2003) to 29 days after discharge of
the last confirmed case-patient (February 17, 2004); con-
firmed H5N1 primary case patient, a patient admitted to
NPH, Hanoi, from December 27, 2003, to January 19,
2004, inclusive with a respiratory illness and influenza A
H5N1 virus detected in clinical specimens by either viral
culture or reverse transcriptase–polymerase chain reaction;
probable H5N1 primary case patient, a patient admitted to
NPH, Hanoi, from December 27, 2003, to January 19,
2004, inclusive with a respiratory illness and high titer of
antibodies to influenza A/H5 detected in a single serum
sample; possible H5N1 secondary case, a hospital employ-
ee who had fever (if measured >38°C), and at least 1 of 3
symptoms (cough, shortness of breath, sore throat), and
contact with a confirmed or probable influenza A H5N1
case-patient, in the absence of exposure to poultry.
Questionnaires
Information was collected by using a self-administered
questionnaire in Vietnamese. Participants were asked their
age, sex, residence address, occupation, department where
they worked, whether they smoked, their medical history,
whether they had symptoms during the study period,
whether they had taken hygienic measures while caring for
H5N1 case-patients, their influenza vaccination status, use
of oseltamivir prophylaxis, and potential risk factors for
H5N1. These risk factors included duration and type of
exposure to H5N1 case-patients, contact with ill poultry or
poultry that died of an illness, and whether they shopped at
live-poultry markets or had freshly butchered or live poul-
try in their home in the previous month. 
Serologic Testing
All participants were asked to provide a single blood
specimen. Serum samples were collected on February 17,
2004, immediately processed, stored at –25°C, and
shipped frozen on dry ice to the Government Virus Unit,
Department of Health, Hong Kong, China. Serum samples
were tested for antibodies to influenza A H5N1 virus by
microneutralization test as described by Rowe et al. (10)
with H5N1 viruses A/Vietnam/1194/2004 and A/Vietnam/
3212/2004. Serum was considered to be positive in the
microneutralization test if an anti-H5 titer of >40 was
obtained in 2 independent assays. Microneutralization
antibody-positive serum was adsorbed with influenza A
H1N1 virus to eliminate the possibility of detecting anti-
body that was cross-reactive among influenza virus of dif-
ferent subtypes, and the microneutralization test was
repeated. No change in antibody titer after adsorption indi-
cated the presence of anti-H5 antibody, while a >4-fold
reduction in microneutralization after adsortion was inter-
preted as evidence for significant cross-reaction.
Microneutralization antibody-positive serum was subject-
ed to Western blot analysis by using recombinant protein
from A/HK/156/97 virus.
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Study Participants
Of 87 eligible staff members who had possible expo-
sure to H5N1 patients, 83 (95.4%) completed a question-
naire and provided a serum sample (Table 1). The median
age of employees was 37.4 years (range 22–55 years), and
53 (64%) were female. Most employees (97.6%) were res-
idents of Hanoi City, Vietnam. Of the 83 employees, 51
(61%) were nurses or nurse’s aides, 19 doctors (23%), 7
(8%) laboratory employees, and 6 (7%) other. Thirty-seven
(45.1%) worked in the intensive care unit (ICU), 30
(36.6%) in the infectious diseases department, 8 (9.8%) in
the laboratory, 6 (7.3%) in radiology, and 1 in the hema-
tology department. More than two thirds (68.3%) of the
employees reported receiving influenza vaccine in 2004,
and 1 person reported taking oseltamivir for treatment of
influenzalike illness since December 27, 2003. No respon-
dents took oseltamivir as prophylaxis against influenza
infection. In total, 76.8% of participants reported contact
with 2 or 3 influenza A H5N1 patients. Four hospital
employees (4.9%) reported no contact with H5N1 patients;
they were all laboratory personnel who had handled clini-
cal material from H5N1 patients. Median duration of expo-
sure to the hospitalized H5N1 primary case-patients
reported was 82 hours, ranging from 1 to 299 hours (N =
78). Most participants reported always wearing protective
masks (94.8%), gloves (61.5%), and eye-protection
(31.6%) while caring for H5N1 patients (Table 2). 
Clinical Symptoms
The figure summarizes the symptoms reported by hos-
pital employees during the study period. Overall, 59
(72.0%) employees reported symptoms during the study
period; 66.0% of these had onset of symptoms within 1 to
7 days after exposure to a H5N1 patient. Median duration
of reported illness was 5 days (range 0–40 days). Three
persons (5.4%) were too ill to work; none were admitted to
the hospital. Two persons (2.4%) who worked in ICU met
the possible secondary H5N1 case-patient definition. They
reported contact with patients but not with sick poultry or
pigs, and neither worked in the laboratory. Both reported
receiving the 2003-2004 influenza vaccine and denied tak-
ing oseltamivir. Table 3 summarizes reported contact with
poultry and pigs by participants. Approximately 1 quarter
of participants (25.6%) reported the presence of poultry
outside their homes, and 2 HCWs (9.5%) reported that
poultry had died in the past month. The 2 possible H5N1
secondary case-patients did not report have poultry dying
outside their homes within the previous month. 
H5N1 Antibody Prevalence
Samples were obtained from all 83 participants, includ-
ing the 2 with possible secondary cases, and none were
positive for antibodies to influenza A H5N1. One sample
initially had an antibody titer of 160 and 640 against
A/Vietnam/1194/2004 and A/Vietnam/3212/2004, respec-
tively. However, microneutralization tests using influenza
A H1N1 viruses showed a high titer of 10,240, and
microneutralization repeated after adsorption with influen-
za A H1N1 virus showed an 8-fold reduction in the anti-
body titer, which was interpreted as indicating a
cross-reacting anti-N1 antibody.
Discussion 
No evidence was found of nosocomial transmission of
H5N1 viruses among 83 hospital employees with exposure
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clinical samples. Anumber of possible factors may explain
these findings: a lack of infectivity of the patients at the
time of admission; the effective use of personal protective
equipment (PPE) and infection control; low sensitivity of
the antibody detection method; lack of susceptibility of
HCWs, or a lack of transmissibility of this particular H5N1
strain.
No data are available on the duration of H5N1 virus
shedding in children. However, for human influenza
viruses, viral shedding at high titers is generally more pro-
longed in children, and virus can be recovered up to 6
days before and 21 days after the onset of symptoms. The
H5N1 patients in this study were admitted with severe ill-
ness 3–7 days after onset of symptoms and PCR-positive
specimens were obtained from the 4 confirmed case-
patients on the day 1 (1 patient), day 2 (1 patient), and day
3 (2 patients) after admission. In addition, live virus was
cultured from samples taken from 2 of the patients on
days l and 3 after admission, respectively. None of the
patients were treated with oseltamivir because this was
not available at the time (9). Two of the patients were
treated orally with the nucleoside analogue ribavirin dur-
ing their admission, 1 on day 4 after admission, and the
other on day 1 (9). However, the 2 other confirmed case-
patients and the probable case-patient did not receive
antiviral treatment and, if human infection with H5N1 is
associated with viral shedding, these patients would be
expected to be contagious during their admission. 
Most hospital employees (94.8%) reported that they
always wore masks while caring for H5N1 patients, and
often the reported type of mask was an N95 respirator.
However, N95 respirators were first available in NPH on
January 7, and some employees reported wearing N95s
before this date. Therefore, reported PPE use in this study
may be biased by inaccurate recall or a tendency to report
behavior that HCWs know is recommended. Enhanced
infection control practices and PPE were instituted on
January 7, and the diagnosis of avian influenza was first
confirmed on January 9. Therefore some HCWs in this
study were likely exposed to H5N1 patients without opti-
mal PPE or infection control. 
Oseltamivir prophylaxis was not used by any of the
staff in this study and therefore did not play a role in pro-
tecting HCWs. Whether the HCWs in the study were pro-
tected by cross-reactive immunity to other influenza A
subtypes is hard to assess. One possible explanation for the
observation that most confirmed H5N1 case-patients are
reported in children or young adults is that older adults are
protected by cross-reactive immunity from previous expo-
sure to other influenza A viruses. This hypothesis requires
further investigation.  
Serum samples were taken from HCWs at least 29 days
after last possible exposure and at a time when the anti-
body response to exposure would be expected to be
detectable (4). Based on a small number of samples, the
sensitivity of microneutralization test in detecting antibod-
ies to H5N1 in children and adults is 88% and 80%,
respectively, while the specificity is 100% and 93%,
respectively (10). Also, the microneutralization assay uti-
lized H5N1 strains isolated from human patients in North
Vietnam, so the negative results are unlikely to be false
negatives due to a poor match between antigen and anti-
body. False-positive results are perhaps more likely, and 1
sample was initially positive but appeared to be due to
cross-reacting anti-N1 antibody. 
Epidemiologic evidence from Vietnam and Thailand
clearly indicates that sustained human-to-human trans-
mission of H5N1 has not yet occurred. Most reports of
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the evidence from Hong Kong of human-to-human trans-
mission and the occurrence of family clusters of H5N1 in
Vietnam and Thailand, no evidence indicates that
influenza A H5N1 has ever caused >1 generation of
human-to-human transmission. Although this study has
not distinguished the inherent transmissibility of the virus
from the influence of infection control or host resistance,
the data provides further reassurance that the risk for
human-to-human transmission of currently circulating
avian H5N1 viruses is low. Studies among household
members of confirmed H5N1 case-patients will provide
additional information on the risk for human-to-human
transmission in the absence of infection control meas-
ures.
While the absolute risk for human-to-human transmis-
sion of avian H5N1 viruses may be low at this time, the
high case-fatality proportion among recent human H5N1
patients demonstrates that the individual consequences of
infection are very serious, and intensive measures to pro-
tect healthcare workers and laboratory staff against infec-
tion remain warranted.  The risk of person-to-person
transmission of H5N1 viruses could increase in the future.
Consequently, every H5N1 case should be managed by cli-
nicians and public health professionals with the assump-
tion that human-to-human transmission can occur and that
the risk for such transmission is unpredictable.
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